d those which violate that instrument. but the decision of the judiciary is final in such a case， whereas in every instance where the veto of the executive is applied it may be overcome by a vote of two-thirds of both houses of congress. the negative upon the acts of the legislative by the executive authority， and that in the hands of one individual， would seem to be an incongruity in our system. like some others of asimilar character， however， it appears to be highly expedient， and if used only with the forbearance and in the spirit which was intended by its authors it may be productive of great good and be found one of the best safeguards to the union. at the period of the formation of the constitution the principle does not appear to have enjoyed much favor in the state governments. it existed but in two， and in one of these there was a plural executive. if we would search for the motives which operated upon the purely patriotic and enlightened assembly which framed the constitution for the adoption of a provision so apparently repugnant to the leading democratic principle that the majority should govern， we must reject the idea that they anticipated from it any benefit to the ordinary course of legislation. they knew too well the high degree of intelligence which existed among the people and the enlightened character of the state legislatures not to have the fullest confidence that the two bodies elected by them would be worthy representatives of such constituents， and， o
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